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Abstract: This paper ,based on the fact that the accounting policy is unilaterally 
supplied by the government, from the perspective of 
 
 
empirical research and game 
analysis, summarizes the events by the form ,which violate the accounting policy and 
have existed, happened or disclosed in accounting field. According to the hypothesis of 
rational person and relevant egocentric motive, and based on the research approach of 
basic game analysis, we try to discuss the profit preference of policy supply, the 
arrangement of power and the reliability of accounting policy. Also we will explain the 
possible reason that why the accounting information widespread has the problem of 
distortion, anomie and misconduct. Furthermore, if there is a large-scale 
non-cooperative game when any policy implements. And when we condemn the corrupt 
behavior such as distortion, anomie and misconduct of the information, we should 
meditate the responsibility of the supply side of accounting policy. 
Key words: The supply side of accounting policy; Implementing party; Profit conflict; 
Strategic behavior 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the distortion, anomie and misconduct of accounting information are the prominent quality 
problems. Generally, the pattern of the logic analysis on these problems is that: in the principal-agent state, 
the information asymmetry results in the behavior: the producers of accounting information take use of 
information superiority, and thus make the adverse selection. The concrete manifestation is that: the 
excessive pursuit of self-interest; poor moral of accountants; weak legal constraint; inadequateness and 
efficiency of the power of government supervision. 
The analysis above based on the firm theory logically seems right, however, we look over a proper 
reference system: when we condemn accountants selfish, who produce the accounting information, we based 
on the hypothesis that: the accounting information is fair and it is the product of the interest balance. We all 
know that the accounting policy, as a measure of the distribution on enterprise benefits, is only made and 
supplied by the government. According to Watts and Zimmerman (1999), as an interest group, the 
self-serving nature of government and government officials spurs them to pursuit for their maximal interest in 
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participating in the political activities3
profit maximization
 (DAI, 2002). However, in the rational person assumption, the aim of 
enterprise legal person is to seek for the maximal profit. Therefore, driven by the , the 
accounting policy unilaterally supplied by the government and the measure of interest distribution run counter 
to enterprises’ expectation of interests, even the bifurcation is quite serious. This provides a basic precondition 
that there is a game between the enterprises, government, their officials and relative interest subjects by 
gaining the initiative on making the accounting information. 
In addition, the accounting policy provided by this unilateral supply system, has a characteristic of 
incompleteness, because the supply side of accounting policy has limited rationality4
limited rationality
 (LU, 1996). If we accept 
that people will not be omniscient, based on the logic of , the supply side of accounting 
policy also has limited cognitive ability, so incompleteness of accounting policy is bound to be an objective 
existence, and then it is a well prove that they constantly issue the supplementary regulations in the process of 
implementation on accounting policy. Meanwhile, incompleteness is the inherent defect of accounting policy, 
which provides a necessary condition for the interest subjects to game. 
 
Figure1: Accounting Policy 
The game between the interest subjects is both a profit-driven behavior, is also an interest conflict. From the 
perspective of the theory on social conflict, the conflict is an interactive stress state with the different interest 
subjects for different goals, gains and losses. And in accordance with western conflict theory, the behavioral 
intention of the game generally refers to the decision-making of a specific behavior. Based on the two 
dimensions: one is cooperation (that the other side is willing to meet the opponent’s aspirations), the other is 
non-cooperation (that the other side refuses to meet the opponent’s aspirations) (SONG, 2004). So, the 
non-cooperation behavior of the producers on accounting information is in the stress state with conflict. 
Studies show that people, in dealing with conflict, always have a basic deviation. Action stage is a stage that 
people openly try to achieve their respective desire. The extent of the conflict can be explained by the conflict 
continuum concept: the intensity of conflict has a continuous process of change from scratch. However, the 
                                                 
3 Their benefit preference would transfer the control of social resources to the government by various of provisions, 
including tax and accounting standards. Because of the existence of political activities, the various damages to 
enterprise are called political cost. (The specific contents include the cost of rent-seeking , the cost of tax control, and 
the cost of social contract and so on.) 
4 The conception of the Bounded rationality is proposed by Simon and Arrow.In the words of Arrow,the bounded 
rationality is the behavior of People that is rational and conscious ,but this rationality is also limited. In North’s opinion, 
the conception of the bounded rationality consists of two aspects: first, the environment is complex. In the non personal 
exchange form, the world which people faced is complicated and uncertained, and more trades leads to more uncertain 
and more incompleted informations. Second, people’s cognitive ability is limited. They can not kown everything . 
Profit 
conflict 
Accounting policy 
Government-the supply side of accounting policy Enterprise-the implement side of accounting policy 
Game strategies: 
1. Presupposed strategy 
2. Inspection strategy 
3. Borrowing strategy 
4. Accounting accreditation strategy 
5. Centralized accounting strategy 
Game strategies: 
1. Execution behavior with resistibility 
2. The implementation behavior  with  flexibility 
3. The behavior of Internal and external accounts 
4. The strategy with lobbying 
Conclusions:   
1. The game of accounting policy is still in the primary state 
2. The present study ignores the deficiencies of the suppliers on accounting policy 
3. Misallocation of game rules 
4. The soft constraints on the suppliers of the accounting policy 
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possibility of cooperation does not have the necessity, and the studies of the game theory have shown that, if 
game participants want to come to an agreement on equilibrium solution in repeated games, the counter-party 
(the best is the stronger party) must take the initiative by a credible commitment to clearly express their 
cooperation intention and communicate it to the other part. If the dilemma involves a number of opponents at 
the same time, they should construct their reputation in the game, and try hard to maintain it, so it is difficult to 
cooperate. Therefore, there are a number of countries in OPEC have non-compliance with the agreements of 
the organization, for example, they privately increase the oil production (LIU, 2003), because of the 
vulnerability and instability of the cooperation. 
Based on the analysis above, the aim of this paper is to reveal the advantages and disadvantages of the 
unilateral supply on accounting policy, and the strategic behaviors of the accounting entity caused by it. 
 
2.  THE UNILATERAL SUPPLY OF ACCOUNTING POLICY
——A PATH DEPENDENCE OF THE SYSTEM EVOLUTION 
 2.1 Accounting—the Micro-Foundation of the Finance  
Accounting activities, as the micro-foundation of the finance, are the necessary procedures of China’s 
financial budget, as well as path dependence of the evolution on China’s accounting system, and its history 
can date back to the revolutionary war time. The characteristic of the institutional arrangement on 
accounting policy unilaterally supplied by the government is that: it is made only for the revolutionary 
struggles in war time; however, after P.R. of China founded, it is for economic recovery; then after the 
Reform and Opening, especially into the market economy, the most obvious improvement of it is the 
liberation of people, which means converting the inhuman tools to profitable essence with humanization; 
seeking the wealth is encouraged by the new policy, thereby, we have finished the historical transform from 
“moral God” to “economic man”. In addition, another characteristic is that the government also participates 
in pursuing the profit. The behavior seeking for the economic interest by the government is always hiding 
under the name of the nation, which is different from the individuals. And it can be proved by the findings 
of audit discovered by the CNAO in the past years (LI, 2004).
There is a specious argument, namely public-choice theory believes that the accounting policy is also a 
public goods standardizing the market order (LIU, 1996); Another one goes further, they suggest that 
accounting policy is a group of public contracts for various social stakeholders led by the government on 
processing programs and methods on accounting, also are the consensus results after repeated games, and are 
a special kind of goods (LEI, 1999). The hole analysis of the public-choice theory founded by 
  
Buchanan are 
based on a precondition that individuals have the complete choice rights, however (TANG, 1996), the 
efficiency of the public choice depends on whether there is enough “competition” ,  and the unanimous 
agreement is seem as the maximum efficiency of public choice. Nevertheless in China, it is clearly that the 
rights of the personal choice don’t exist, and in this case, how can we imagine the possibility that the situation 
with “unanimous agreement” will appear? Secondly, the accounting policies as the particular public goods, 
themselves have two possible provision solutions: they can be provided either by the Government (such as 
China) or by the market (such as United States). Accounting policies provided by the Government only have 
efficiency advantages, but the degree of consensus might not be well; while the market with the defect 
efficiency may have a high degree of consensus (e.g., the “rounding” rule on solving the problems of change). 
Finally, we need to advance the cost of accounting knowledge, using and consuming the accounting policies, 
such as tuition, books, internship fees, training costs and time, which is inconsistent with the basic 
characteristic of the public goods. 
We also need an indigenous detailed inquiry: the supply of the accounting policy is the process with 
“gaming repeatedly by the participants”, or not? What is the foundation? Is it conflict with Chinese historical 
position that“Chinese socialism is still at an early stage”? In fact, we “have just taken the first step of the game, 
from the perspective of the institutional choice, it arranges for the benefit of the government, which inevitable 
lead to the emergence of the game phenomenon that ‘there are always countermeasure to the policy’. For the 
other part of the game---‘false accountings everywhere’ is not surprising. From this perspective, the 
establishment of the China’s accounting system still needs to go through a process of game, and there is a 
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certain distance to the ‘Nash equilibrium’ (WU, XIAO, 1997).” 
The efficiency of the unilateral supply program with the traditional system is superior to the mechanism 
formed after the dispersive bargaining. The process of making accounting policies is in pursuing of the 
efficiency function, which inevitably will result in deletion of the reliability
why did the people defining the concept of 
"public contract" and "public goods" not provide clues of these basic game and historical facts? Supposing 
they take these as a kind of common sense and without listing, why the author can’t find them in the relative 
literatures? According to the opinions mentioned above, the host system also is special public goods provided 
by the government to regulate the market order, is it ridiculous that the theory is used without considering the 
theoretical soil? 
2.2 Financial Department: the Unilateral Supply Side of the Accounting 
5
foreshadowing
 (AN, XI, 2004) (degree of the 
collective consensus). At the same time, in essence, as a measure of the benefit distribution, the supply of 
the accounting policy without the degree of the collective consensus do not have the property of the rigid 
constraint. The accrual basis, as well as the policy options due to the uncertainty of the economic activities, 
inevitably derives the negative consequences: game with rules (there is always countermeasure to the 
policy; looking for the policy loopholes). This provides the  for the game on the execution 
process of the accounting policy. 
2.3 Mechanism of the In-System Negotiation 
In order to overcome the defects of the reliability and increase the degree of the collective consensus in the 
process of accounting policy supplied, the supply side always prefers to take in-system negotiations for 
correction. However, the quality of the correction has been strongly questioned in practice. First of all, the 
participants of mechanism of the in-system negotiation are mainly the large state-owned enterprises, which 
have closed relationship with the policies’ supplier, and they have strong bargaining power. Nevertheless, 
the number of these enterprises is comparatively low, also they lack the representation of the public will; 
Next, non-state-owned enterprises, making great contributions to the development of China’s economy, are 
excluded from the negotiation mechanism, and they lack the bargaining power for their own interest in 
public policy, although they have discourse power. Finally, the aim giving priority to the state when making 
the accounting policies, makes their implementation scheme has an obvious tendency. For example, the 
sound accounting policy has an obvious convergent characteristic, and its application has a certain 
constraints in different degrees. Exposure drafts issued in 2002, returned only four, which is 
disproportionate with the present situation that there are 12 000,000 people going in for the accountancy. So, 
it is important to co-ordination with international practice and standards construction, while the urgent 
affair is to transform people’s ideology. 
Although the mechanism of negotiation existed, the contract on the profit distribution is not actively agreed 
by the participants with different bargaining power in the process of the bargaining. Yet, the contract results 
from the arrangement of different participants. And this will inevitably lead to secretly contest by the 
disadvantaged negotiators in the future, who are not satisfied with the results.  
2.4 Sovereignty Concept and International Standards 
With the acceleration of the pace on Reform and Open in China, as well as the improvement of the 
dependence on international economy, sovereignty concept on accounting standards in China is gradually 
diluted by the opinion of integration; thereby it removes the unequal condition between the national 
interests and social interests in the accounting policy. Our government departments have also expressed a 
positive attitude, “China will continue to improve the international coordination on accounting, and 
establish high-quality system of the accounting standards in accordance with the development requirement 
                                                 
5 The concept of reliability proposed here is to explain that regardless of personal judgment ability ,the reliability of the 
Unanimous decision rule is always higher than personal judgment and decision. The proposed result shows that since 
this year, the use frequency of “conflict of interest” has even exceeded “Greenspan”, which had been a proper name. 
The fifth proposition once again proved that when the members remain unchanged, the reliability of a committee’s 
decision can be enhanced by increasing the stringency of the majority rule. Northwest University. 
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of China’s economy and international practice” (FENG, 2004).6
accelerated depreciation
 The fact we can observe now is that: since 
the mid-nineties of last century, the evolution of the accounting policy marked by the accounting standards 
is according to the international practice, Moreover, with the deepening of the economic reform in China, 
entry of the WTO, and a series of important events, internationalization of the accounting standards has 
become increasingly apparent. However, we also can observe that: there are some restrictive barriers (such 
as , reserve extraction ratio, the programs of assets measurement, and so on), set by 
the suppliers in the process of the implementation on the accounting policy, and the internal explanation is 
that finance tolerance is limited. 
 
3.  GAME STRATEGIES IN THE PROCESS OF 
IMPLEMENTING ACCOUNTING POLICY 
From the perspective of the contract, the accounting policy can be seen as a kind of contract on the profit 
distribution. But there is difference between the accounting and enterprise contracts: the power 
arrangement of the participants involved in accounting policy is not inconsistent or equivalent. The 
problem is that: although the supply sides, who have advantage in the legal, conforms to the established 
rules in terms of making accounting policy, and has profit preference in the regulations of the technical 
application on accounting policy, they can’t represent the tens of thousands of economic subjects applying, 
implementing accounting policy and producing the accounting information. Meanwhile, it is improved that 
its monitoring efficiency is low, which manifests hysteretic nature, high cost, and soft constraint.  
The game behavior in the process oft implementing accounting policy only can be explained by “conflict of 
interest”. 7 If we accept that any accounting policy has inherent defect, for the same reason, we also believe 
that the strategy behaviors in the process of implementing accounting policy, under the driven force of the 
profit, are taken to adapt the inherence defect of current accounting policy. And in the case of information 
asymmetry, the result of this adaptation is a change to the distribution program of the current accounting 
policy. From the traditional perspective, this change involves two main players in the game: both shareholders 
and corporate managers (execution on accounting policy). Present studies suggest that the game subjects 
involve in three parties: shareholders, corporate managers and the institutions which make up of the 
accounting policy (CHEN, CHEN, 2003), 8  which ignores the advantage of the large and minority 
shareholders in information master, power arrangement and diverging interests, as well as ignores the interest 
inconsistency between enterprises and their managers.9
                                                 
6 Two Ministries, “the Internationalization of Accounting Should Taking Chinese Situation into Consideration”, 
Securities Times, 5 November. 
 Based on the research, without considering writing 
conveniently, the game should consist of suppliers, enterprise managers (execution of accounting policy), 
shareholders, EGAOB and the enterprise employee, that is to say, it is a multilateral game. Because the game 
behavior of enterprise employee is hard to measure, and EGAOB’s is a special form, which need analyze 
separately, we don’t include them in the game.  
The game composed by the five parties, is quite complex, therefore this paper mainly analyzes the 
participants’ possible strategic behaviors and the consequences in the process of profit distribution. Its feature 
is that it treats the supply sides as the participants of the game, rather than the precondition. 
7 In an article titled “the moral hazard which existed everywhere ”in September 4 ,2000’s Wall Street Journal, the 
author discovered that if one search the “conflicts of interest” and “Merrill Lynch” together, …The conmen case is that 
whatever words “conflicts of interest” matched with, there are always full of hated stories. “conflicts of interest”is the 
starting point where we observe all parties involved in the accounting policy game, and is even more a key to explain 
the game behavior of supply side of the accounting policy 
8 CHEN Donghua, CHEN Xinyuan. (2003). Interests Reconciliation in China Accounting Standard Setting: Evidence 
from A Case Study on Shenzhen Fountain Corp. Accounting Research, 6, 3-11. 
9 There are two important facts which can explain this matter. (1) In the securities market, the non-tradable shares are 
big problem and are till in suspense. The phenomenon larger shareholders plunder minority ones always happens, and 
the phenomenon of “one share being overwhelming big”is severely heckled by all sides.(2) since the event, Yu Zhian as  
an the chairman of Wu Han Long Active Group fled with money, happened in the mid-nineties of last century, many 
similar events constantly appeared. At that time, academic circles explain this phenomenon with transition theory of 
Masahiko Aoki, they think it is a “spontaneous privatization” in “interior agent agent”. 
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3.1 Execution Behavior with Resistibility10
The resistant behavior of the accounting game refers that: if some particular accounting policies (such as 
the company’s benefit allocation ratio) hurt their profit, they will take the initiative to hold back the interest 
with the motivation of one’s own interest. In addition, its characteristic is antagonistic to the law. Generally, 
the resistant behavior of the accounting policy with resistance always embodies leadership behavior, also 
the 
 
behavior subjects have a strong bargaining power. 
     The typical resistant behavior of the accounting game can be summarized as follows: (1) controlling the 
profit distribution. The leadership or the controlling shareholders of the company often manipulate the profit 
distribution for various reasons by artificially changing the original distribution ratio, in order to maintain 
more profit; (2) changing the identification time of the accounting elements. The participants change the 
identification time of the accounting elements by putting off or advancing it, to make the accounting results 
benefit for themselves; (3) choosing the advantageous quantitative methods on accounting elements such as 
measurement of stock and potential loss;(4) circulation out of the system on the income from management or 
non-management. Hidden deposits and small treasures are the typical resistant behavior of the game. 
3.2 The Implementation Behavior with Flexibility 
The economic explanation of the flexible behavior is that: people take advantage of the institutional 
loophole to the full or amend the violation risk minimally in order to achieve the aim increasing the interest. 
The characteristic of the behavior on accounting game with flexibility is that it can make technical 
conversion within the law. “Flexibility” as a concept with “Chinese characteristics”, is an appropriate 
vocabulary, which we can use to comprehend the accounting behavior.  
Although the suppliers often attempt to clear the requirements of the standard by adding rules, they expect it 
can restrain the radical behavior of the accounting. However, accountants sometimes avoid the restrictions by 
making trading rules. In this case, the standards may be assaulted by the opportunistic motivation of the 
enterprise administration (LI, WU, 2004).  
     The technical default is a common form of the flexible behavior, in which the accountants should be 
supposed to adopt one appropriate program to deal with the bargaining, however they adapt another one 
instead. And the result obviously leads to variable effects to the repot messages (such as the event of 
advertising amortization in Harbin Pharmaceutical Group); in addition, the assets reorganization, debt 
restructuring, and investment activities and so on are also the flexible behaviors. 
3.3 The Behavior of Internal and External Accounts11
                                                 
10 “Resistibility “is from the research on ways against the powers of the lower group of James C. Scott, as a political 
anthropologist in Yale University. In his opinion, the resistance methods include non-cooperation, rascal, complying in 
public but opposing in private and so on. Chinese scholars Ben Xu summarized James C. Scott’s resistance theory as 
“the weak resistance”, which is in line with this article’s context. 
 
The form of internal and external account on accounting business (namely known as the two account books) 
is another special type of game behavior. And its characteristics can be summarized as follows: it is a game 
strategy in order to fictitiously cater to the institutional supervision from the external specialized organ of 
state power. The organizations which make two account books are generally the enterprises with the poor 
bargaining power compared with the supply-sider of the accounting policies.  
The form of internal and external accounts can be divided into the holistic one and local one. The former 
has higher risk; it is easy to be found, consequently, makers always bribe the tipstaffs or senior officials to 
decrease the risks. The latter has relatively lower risk, thus the makers avoid or reduce the detection risk by 
bribery afterwards.  
11 The behavior making two accounting books is always seen in newspapers or magazines, but there is no detail and 
sufficient data about it. On one hand, it is hard to gain the data, on the other hand, it also reflects the non-rigorous 
attitude on accounting research including the author. Of course, there is some relate with examination  and evaluation 
system on academic research in China. 
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3.4 The Strategy with Lobbying  
The lobbying strategy is usually used by the foreign enterprises and powerful interest groups. For example, 
the draft on the unity of income taxes levied from domestic and foreign-funded enterprises has been 
completed, and the administrative department thinks that the opportunity has been ripe, however, 54 
multinational corporations strongly demand that: “Cancel the 5 to10 years’ transition period of the tax 
preference policy to the foreign enterprises”. At present, tax preference is one of China’s few competitive 
means, and it is an obvious example that 54 multinational enterprises unite to lobby. The multinational 
enterprises, seeking for the profit maximization after tax, usually select more favorable ways to develop 
markets, and adopt various tax shelters to decrease the overall tax burden. Haggling over every penny is the 
real nature of the multinational enterprises, when calculating their own interests (WANG, 2005).  
The domestic strong interest groups also use their bargaining power to maintain their profits. The 
performance reports promulgated by China life (HK2628), ping an insurance (HK2318) and PICC (HK2328), 
show that: there are total 2.782 billion losses in investment in 2004, partly caused by the funds, particularly the 
closed-end funds. Therefore, the insurance companies strongly promote the Ministry of Finance, the 
supervision department of the securities and insurance to be an investigation group, investigating the 
accounting system on insurance companies which invest in securities investment funds, simultaneously, they 
hope to valuate the closed-end securities investment fund with net value. “In doing so, the profits of the 
insurance companies can increase by 9.9 billion overnight.” said by a researcher in the Galaxy Securities Fund 
Research Center. From the insurance companies’ perspective, accounting standards , which valuate funds 
with market price, rather than with net value, will bring great losses to the investors, because the regulation of 
the accounting on funds mainly refers to the standards of “Enterprise Accounting Standard” and “Financial 
Enterprise Accounting System” at present, and within the insurance companies, there are different valuation 
modes to different funds: open-end funds are valuated in accordance with long-term investment, while 
closed-end funds are valuated in accordance with short-term investment. Owning to the higher discount rate 
of the closed-end funds, most insurance investments bring about huge loss. In order to remove this part of loss, 
some experts suggest dividing the closed-end fund into two types: transaction and non-trading, in addition, it 
estimated with net value under long-term holding, rather than with market price under short-term holding. 
Because “the final modification of the accounting standards need the approval of Ministry of Finance, 
insurance companies actively promote Ministry of Finance to do it”(SUN, LI, 2005).
Inspection strategy. From the reform of enterprises institution, finance inspection office was built by 
finance department, which had worked until 1997. 
  
3.5 The Game Strategies of the Suppliers on Accounting Policies 
The game strategies are respectively given based on different periods, from the perspective of supply-siders 
on accounting policies: 
 Presupposed strategy. It means making relevant sanctions in accounting policy (Counting Laws in China, 
which passed on 21st, January, 1985 at the 9th and 7th meeting in 6th National People’s Congress; the 12th 
meeting in 9th National People’s Congress on 31st, October, 1999) and a series rules and institutions based on 
it. All of these presupposed strategies are designed according to the old experiences and lessons got from 
mistakes, however, it has an ineffective foresees and a problem of unsound legal system.  
12
                                                 
12 The accounting inspection leaded by Finance Ministry has different aims, some are for general inspections of 
taxation, finance and prices; some are for maintaining the accounting order, some are for inspecting the implantation of 
“Accounting Law”. Even Supreme People's Court involves in this active. Financial Accounting, No.12 [2000]. 
Later, because of the separation of government and 
enterprise, the accounting firm takes on the duty; while, the accounting firm is managed by the China 
Certificated Public Accounting Association (CPAA), which is managed by finance department, in this way, 
the inspection strategy has to be done in a indirect way.  
Borrowing strategy, or namely “borrowing the achievement of the government”. Since the focus of the 
official audit is on the revenue and expenditure, and the achievements of official audit are much related to the 
revenue and expenditure, so it can be seen that this kind of borrowing strategy is a double-blades sword in 
essence. 
BAI Jiandong; AN Liren/International Business and Management Vol.2 No.2, 2011   
84 
 Accounting accreditation strategy. In 2000, the notice of “Some Suggestions about How to Test out the 
Accounting Accreditation Strategy” is printed and distributed by the Finance Ministry and Ministry of 
Supervision (SUN, KONG, 2001), and there are more than 8 forms of accounting accreditation strategies13
 Centralized accounting strategy. Since Shan’ xi Province government system had put the centralized 
accounting strategy into effect in 2001, more and more local governments put it into effect gradually. Without 
changing the ownership of the unit bankroll, the finance autonomy and the approve right of expenditure, they 
built up the accounting center, which specially managed the accountings, 
 in 
connection with the phenomenon “a tenable one can’t hold out against the pressure,but one who can hold out 
against the pressure can’t be tenable”.  
capital settlement, bank accounts, 
and the financial revenue and expenditure in a centralized way. This strategy has became popular at that time 
and was accredited as “a new creative form to manage the reform and to strongmen the financial inspection.” 
(LI, 2003) 
Inspection strategy, accounting accreditation strategy, and centralized accounting strategy are the 
countermeasures of the suppliers for the game behavior in the process of implementing the accounting policy. 
Otherwise, many problems appeared during the process of executing the strategy, such as “going against the 
basic and fundamental principles of modern enterprise system; going against the legislative purpose of the 
Accounting Laws, caused by the misunderstand of accounting inspection; lacking the sufficient support from 
the law; bringing about the excessive concentration of power in finance department, which affects the 
transparency of the budget” and so on (SUN, KONG, 2001). 
                                                 
13 Theory Circle summarized the accountant appointment system as forms of 
Up to now, the Inspection strategy has been 
suspended because of the conflict with reform, while accounting accreditation strategy and the centralized 
accounting strategy are in a dilemma. 
In addition, inspection from the tax department, business administration, higher authorities and the 
management of the development zone, is made on the enterprises’ accountancy materials. No doubt, the 
multilateral inspection increases the enterprise burden, and induces them to adapt the game strategy with 
flexibility and make internal and external accounting books for the inspection. 
 
4.  THE CONDITION, ENVIRONMENT AND 
NON-COOPERATIVE CHARACTERISTIC OF THE 
PLURALISTIC GAME 
4.1 The Condition of the Pluralistic Game 
Game likes the chess, in which people should make their choice according to the opponent’s. In the game, 
people learn with each other, hamper with each other, and finally, the game reach to the equilibrium. 
The sentence of accounting policy is the standard of the interest distribution, so there are consequentially 
some conditions in the games. At present, the game conditions are as follows: (1) the separation of the 
economic ownership: namely, the owners’ property right is controlled respectively by the owners, operators, 
actual users and the creditors in the normal state or non-normal state. And its theory origin can date back to e 
Hayek's economic thought; (2) information asymmetry; (3) insider control under the independent 
management; (4) the low efficiency of the supervision mechanism: the efficiency of the current supervision 
mechanism is low in the discovery, reflection, investigation and the control , in some cases, it even performs 
omission; (5) there are loopholes in the law: firstly, the provisions of the law are too inattentive, and it is 
difficult to effectively solve the complex economic phenomena; secondly, there also have the phenomena: 
“failure to handle affairs according to the law and laxity in law enforcement, and refrain from punishing 
law-breakers”. What’s more, there are some significant defects in the process of enforcement, especially for 
the illegal activities of the government organizations, they just circulate a notice, (accountability system is 
only for the events involving personal safety, and just removes the party from the office). The annual reports 
by Audit Commission Audit Commission do not bring the deterrent force in the law. 
financial supervision system, direct 
appointment system, chief accountant appointment, Centralized accounting, internal appointment and so on. 
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4.2 Institutional Environment  
Institutional environment of the game refers to the special institution or living space rational person faced 
with, including a collection of a range of environmental factors such as political basis, property right 
arrangement, legal environment, and competitive market. 
In the study of institutional environment on native game, Wu Si’s “latent rules” has an accurately and 
clearly explanatory power. In order to prevent the conflict in context, we might as well rewrite the expression 
of the “latent rules” (WU, 2001). (The writer will undertake all the responsibilities for the distortion or 
misreading by rewriting). “The power legitimately determining the interest distribution” is granted by the 
suppliers of the accounting policy. So all kinds of resources and benefits should be allocated and re-adjusted 
according to it. In this process, their aim is only to minimize the losses for the participants who are lack of the 
bargaining power. 
Some game activities exist in a certain institutional environment, which provides the game rules, opponents, 
and the space of strategy selection. If there is a relatively high degree of consensus in the institutional 
environment, the game rules tend to be a dynamic equilibrium, and the space of strategy selection is limited 
and can be expected. On the contrary, if there are some constraint conditions in the environment, the space of 
strategy selection will be infinity, which increases the difficulties of the exception for the gamers with 
bounded rationality.   
The political environment of China takes “stability overrides everything” as the highest purpose, therefore, 
a series of the reforms in the economic field should be subject to this purpose. The reform makes concessions 
when it conflicts with the purpose, So, China’s economic reform must submit to the political requirement, and 
its institutions must be controlled; thus the fiscal policy of the concentration of wealth has become to resolve 
the political choice of the risk of economic reform, that implied the financial policy which subject to the 
centralized social wealth and accounting policies too. Tax federalism implemented in 1994 and the policy 
re-delineated the proportion of revenue sharing in 2002 also reflect the effect of wealth collecting.14
The “hidden rules” is an acquiescent existence in the evolution of the accounting policy, then, the legal 
system and environment are consequentially influenced by these rules, and the typical case is the “yin guang 
sha”. After the case of skullduggery in the accounting report occurred, lots of minority shareholders 
prosecuted the company and asked for the compensation, but the SPC did not accept this security civil 
compensation cases according to the No.406 notification implemented on 24
 
th of September in 2001, not only 
this lead to many investors of the “yin guang sha” and active lawyers are great disappointed, but also it caused 
some securities industry and relevant experts filled with indignation (Zhou, 2002). Although on 15th of 
January in 2002, SPC unveils the regulation: notification on accepting the dispute of civil infringement caused 
by the false statement in the securities market, and shows that they can conditionally accept these cases.15 
Since the regulation has unveiled, many courts accepted more than 900 cases which caused by the false 
statement in 12 listed companies, but there is no one case (Li, 2003). The face that “listed companies make 
fraud, but the investors pay for it”, is not normal, but it is consistent with the principles of the “hidden rules”: 
“it should be punished for buying the stock” (ZHANG, 2004). Meanwhile, the indulgence of the law is an 
important factor for the “hidden rules” to be rampant. Frederic Bastiat, as the famous French economic thinker, 
distinguished two types of exploitation in his book: “property, law and government” (Frederic Bastiat, QIU, 
2003), 
Not only from the perspective of individual rationality, but also based on the standpoint or the observing 
fact of the positivism, according to the essence of the profit distribution on accounting policy, the national 
One is not authorized by the plunder law, one is legal plunder. We can draw a conclusion from “yin 
guang sha” case that: the indulgence of the law obviously belongs to the latter.  
4.3 Non-cooperative Feature of the Game 
                                                 
14 System of tax distribution implemented since 1994 and the policy of re-allocation on tax ratio in 2002 also reflect the 
concentration of wealth effect. 
15 According to the “rules on civil compensation case caused by false statement in securities market” of Supreme 
People's Court provide ,investors prosecute the civil compensation case caused by false statement, should submit the 
evidences as follows: (1) Identity certificates of the nature person, legal person or other organization;(2) transaction 
certification of the investment, which caused losses, in addition to notice of administrative punishment, or document of 
the criminal judgment. 
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interests, company interests, internal interests, sustainable management, opportunistic choice, 
accumulating wealth and distribution all embody the non-cooperative feature of the game at the present 
even in future. 
According to M.Olon,’s logic of collective action, the individual rationality is not a sufficient condition for 
achieving the collective rationality, and rational individuals will not take the cooperative collective action for 
the common interests (Mancur Olson, CHEN). Therefore, it is a common phenomenon that “there's always 
countermeasure to the policy” in the process of implementing of the accounting policy. The concrete express 
is as follows. “if you have policies, I have countermeasures” ----implementation of the substitutability, 
“misinterpret the policies, and adopt what is useful from others”----selective implementation, “try their best to 
refused to obey”---- symbolic implementation, “making local policy” ----accessory implementation. In 
additional to the conflicts between the central and the local interest, the defects of public policy itself, impelled 
by the benefits of the departmentalism and the local protectionism, the logic of collective action is also a major 
factor (CHEN, 2003).
Institutional arrangement on the unilateral supply of the accounting policy should reflect the principles of 
fairness, justice and unity. The important reason of the low efficiency on policy implementation is that our 
accounting policy tends to the government’s interest too much. The policy which tends to the tax revenue 
maximization does not based on the principle of fairness, justice and unity; on the contrary, it maintains the 
government’s interest at first. In the real world, the accounting policy has the benefit attribute, and the 
people who has the instituting power can provide the benefit boundary to a large extent. From the negative 
perspective, it will encourage the functional departments to be bureaucracy and disregard their duty and 
  
Next, the iron law of the management is that: if a policy implements effectively, they must be identified by 
majority people. Otherwise, management is unable to proceed because of the cost factors. At present in China, 
the interest distribution of the accounting policy tends to the government group, which obviously has 
bifurcation with the company and the individual interest, and this will lead to the result of non-cooperative 
game. The facts of the failure on the varieties of accounting policies, caused by various forms of inspections 
on the implementation of the Group's accounting policies, approves the iron law of management. 
Finally, the behavior of the supply-side on accounting policy belongs to the category of government power; 
however, the boundary of the government power is very vague and can be easily crossed. If the ratio of the 
interest distribution provided by the government goes beyond the bottom line which the wealth creators can 
accept, there will be a game between the government and the rational individuals. Similarly, if the proportion 
of the after-tax profit distribution provided by managers is not fair to the investors, they will game by voting 
with feet. Larger shareholders bully the minority ones in profit distribution, and class action has become the 
preferred game strategy. Because the ownership structure of our state-owned enterprises is too concentrate, 
and the state-owned shares is in the holdings position, which will lead to the larger shareholders and managers 
form a superposition, the pattern of the game involving in supply-side fiscal policies of the government, larger 
shareholders or corporate managers and small investors, is unequal in power. 
5.  NUMBERS OF CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Some Conclusions 
5.1.1 The game of accounting policy is still in the primary state 
In game’s primary state, the participants do not believe each other, and try their best to understand each 
other’s bottom line. With the gradual increase of the game’s intensity, the game frequency between the 
policies and the countermeasures is increasing. The transition period is the time mark of the primary state, 
advancing interests at the expense of others is the standard strategies, and its results can not be expected is 
the basic characteristic.  
5.1.2 The present study ignores the deficiencies of the suppliers on accounting 
policy 
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responsibility. If the departments or the managers take advantage of the interest mentioned above actively, 
it is inevitable to cause power rent-seeking, and leads to money-power exchange. 
December in 2004, OECD published a new guidance of corporate governance----“guidance of corporate 
governance on state-owned companies in OECD (draft)”. In this draft, it uses such words about government 
department: “state body，ministry or administration”. In this context, these three words are also defined as 
“the government (state) organ, government department (but it is generally used to be the department which 
directly have no relation with the market or have no power of administrative supervision)”, and administrative 
supervision department (which has connection with market, and possibly affects the benefit distribution). 
“Because of the size of the state, the conventions and traditions of the administrative supervision department, 
there appears a new strong bureaucratic body.” (Note 42 in the “guidance of corporate governance on 
state-owned companies in OECD (draft)”). Therefore, the government consciously or not adopts the behavior 
of “government intervention” and “rule-making” to advance the national credit to the market, finally overdraft 
the credit and result in the social unbalance. (Introduction 6 in the “guidance of corporate governance on 
state-owned companies in OECD (draft)”) (LU, 2005) 
5.1.3 Misallocation of game rules 
In the democratic society, people’s behaviors are based on the rules, these rules are the result of the struggle 
and the compromise. Rules generated in two ways: one is made by the prior, another is made by struggle, 
and the rules of the social competition appeared in the second way. We need the reform based on rules. The 
reform based on the rules is more efficient and justice than without rules. With the rules, people have a well 
expectation to the reform, and it is not only convenient for people to abide to the game rules, but convenient 
to supervise the game rules. 
It is a common sense that when the suppliers provide the accounting policy, they also make the 
corresponding rules on implement, at the same tine, the power of providing the accounting policy should be 
equivalent to the corresponding responsibility. However, in the specific transition period, this common sense 
may not be respected by the people who are in power. At present, misallocation of the game rules manifests as 
follows. ①less remuneration and more obligation; ②more rights and fewer obligation; ③too much benefit 
and power, but too little responsibility; ④ having right but no obligation; ⑤having obligation but no right. 
These manifestations will change the combination way of the human and material objects, and people’s 
behavior as well (LI, 1995). However in China, the misallocation of the game rules caused by the institutional 
arrangement of the unilateral supply on accounting policy belongs to the second, third and forth kind, the 
misallocation of the medium and small investors belongs to the first and fifth kinds, and the misallocation of 
the large shareholders or managers is in between”. In addition, the suppliers should clear recognize that the 
accounting policy is not effective once enacted, it must obtain people’s recognition, then they will obey them, 
otherwise, the supervision cost will be infinite. 
5.1.4 The soft constraints on the suppliers of the accounting policy 
In the principal-agent theory, there are two cores of the corporate governance: first, the power must be 
balanced and supervised; second, information disclosure must be full and transparent. In recent years, 
accounting department strictly acquires the enterprises to comply with the accounting policy, meanwhile, 
they criticize righteously the distortion, anomie and misconduct to the accounting information. The audit 
reports to the People’s Congresses at all levels disclose the problems of illegal, violating discipline in recent 
years. So, the    phenomenon that suppliers strictly require the people to obey the accounting rules, but 
slackly require themselves, makes us can’t help asking: who manages the managers? (LI, 1995)
Accounting policy involves in many stakeholders, and also it relates to the public trust of the government. 
In order to increase the execution efficiency and decrease the supervision cost of the accounting policies, as 
the suppliers, government not only need to perfect the form of the accounting policy, but also carefully 
  
5.2 Some Recommendations 
5.2.1 Increasing the degree of consensus in the process of making accounting 
policies 
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draw the stakeholders’ suggestions, especially the bitter truth, which can increase the degree of consensus 
in the process of making accounting policies.  
Through a certain institutional arrangements, the process of project establishment, draft formulation, solicit 
opinion, modification, and issuance on the policies, should be supervised by the different departments within 
the government, also should even more be monitored by the whole society. To do this, the administrative 
supervision departments must strictly require themselves with the same standards, even the higher ones. Thus, 
the effective supply and the social consensus on the accounting policy have been half successful. 
5.2.2 Improving the independence of the law 
If the policy makers make themselves out of the reform, then the motive of reform is very suspicious, and it 
may be hypocritical eyewash. Therefore, when formulating the laws and regulations of the accounting, the 
policy markers should make them consistent with the legislative procedure of the reform, strengthen the 
hearings, and open the proposals in public. In a word, the process of enacting the bills should be transparent. 
Meanwhile, they should strengthen supervision and legislative review mechanism, and safeguard the 
fairness and justice of legislations. After full use of social resources in the legislation, the unilateral supply 
of the accounting policy by government (specific characteristics of China’s legislative commission) is 
turned into multi-supply by government and society, which comes true the double justice of the forms and 
the contents on the accounting policy.    
5.2.3 Improving the setting of the game rules 
“Nat • Weikesaier, in his basic work studies on financial theory in 1896, remind people notice the rules, 
furthermore he realizes that: the attention of the reform should be paid to changing the rules with the 
constraint condition, rather than changing the expected result by exerting an influence on behaviors”. 
We should explore the benign alternative plan, thus let us get rid of 
(BU, 
1996) 
First, designing rules must reach to the legislative justice, which can be realized by fair competition in the 
legislators’ position, and on this basis, we should develop certain procedures to design the rules in order to let 
the society satisfy. Second, designing rules should include two aspects: one is the punishment after violating 
the rules; the other is the constraint on the executors. Finally, the execution rules of the accounting policy must 
be justice, and any part against it, they must accept the punishment.  
the dilemma game which was 
factitiously amplified at the transition period, as well as make the game rules with the same powers and 
responsibilities, and the accounting policy compatible with interest go back to the normal society. The path of 
the institutional innovation on the supply of the accounting policy reflects the complexity, arduousness and 
systematic of the innovation on public policy, because it needs to fully take the boundary, constraint condition 
of the innovation into consideration; and it needs to take the requirements of the technology and quality on 
innovation into consideration; besides, we need to estimate the cost and income of the innovation. So, the 
institutional innovation on the supply of the accounting policy has become an important variable in increment 
function at the transition period, and it has been the necessary factors and the sufficient condition in the 
transition economy. 
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